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Abstract:  Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) embodies a new philosophy
for managing air traffic. The initial implementation of CDM in the US has been
aimed at Ground Delay Program Enhancements (GDP-E).  However, the
underlying concepts of CDM have the potential for much broader applicability.
This paper reviews on-going and proposed CDM research streams. The topic areas
discussed include:  ground delay program enhancements;  collaborative routing;
performance monitoring and analysis;  collaborative resource allocation
mechanisms;  game theory models for analyzing CDM procedures and
information exchange;   collaborative information collection and distribution.
1 Introduction
Advances in the technology underlying communications, navigation and
surveillance are leading the way toward Free Flight, an architecture in  which the
responsibility for the safe progress of an aircraft through the  airspace can be
shared between the pilot and the air traffic controllers.  Collaborative Decision-
Making (CDM) is a concept that goes hand-in-hand with  Free Flight. Under
CDM, the management of traffic flows and the associated  resource allocation
decisions are conducted in a way that gives significant  decision making
responsibility to the Airline Operational Control Centers  (AOCs). Under the pre-
Free Flight and pre-CDM paradigms, the air traffic  controllers and traffic flow
managers were viewed as a central planning  authority with total responsibility
both for the short term control of an  aircraft to insure its safety and for the longer
term management of flight  schedules to insure effective traffic throughput. Free
Flight and CDM are  based on the principles of information sharing and
distributed decision  making. The overall objectives of CDM can be summarized
as:  
   generating better information, usually by merging flight data directly from the
Airspace System with information generated by airspace users;
  creating common situational awareness by distributing the same information
both to traffic managers and to airspace users;
  creating tools and procedures that allow airspace users to respond directly to
capacity/demand imbalances and to collaborate with traffic flow managers in
the formulation of flow management actions.
CDM was initially conceived in the mid-1990s within the FADE (FAA Airlines
Data Exchange) project. The FADE project, as well as the initial operational
implementation of CDM, has been aimed at the development of new operational
procedures and decision support tools for implementing and managing ground
delay programs (GDPs). However, it has become clear that the CDM philosophy
and principles can, and should be, applied to a much broader class of  problems in
air traffic management.  
In this paper we describe on-going CDM research and propose future research
directions. The research areas we review are grouped as follows:
  Ground Delay Program Enhancements
  Collaborative Routing
  Performance Monitoring and Analysis
  Collaborative Resource Allocation Mechanisms
  Game Theory Models for Analyzing CDM Procedures and Information
Exchange
  Collaborative Information Collection and Distribution
2. GDP Enhancements
The primary focus of CDM in the US has been the modification and improvement
of GDP procedures, known as GDP enhancements. The collaboration between
government and industry was born out of the FAA’s need for real-time operational
information from the airlines and the airlines’ desire to gain  more control over
their operations during a GDP, especially in matters with  economic
consequences.  
The major enhancements made to GDPs by the CDM working group to date are
(see [Wambsganss 1997] or [Hoffman et al 1999] for details):
	  the removal of (unintentional) disincentives for the airlines to report up-to-
date flight status and intention information;

  the development of a mechanism (the Compression algorithm) to perform
dynamic, inter-airline slot swapping that utilizes arrival slots vacated by
canceled or delayed flights;
  the ability of traffic flow managers to revise program parameters during a
GDP that are dependent upon stochastic conditions (e.g., airport acceptance
rate);
  the dissemination of accurate aggregate forecasts of arrival demand at all
major airports in the US to all traffic flow managers and to all airline
operational control centers (AOCs);
  the distribution of a uniform sett of tools for formulating an analyzing GDPs
to the Air Traffic Control System Control Center (ATCSCC) and to all AOCs
- these tools are packaged in decision support tool known as the Flight
Schedule Monitor (FSM).
A number of relatively short-term research projects are underway to enhance  the
basic application of CDM to GDPs. An area of general importance involves
modeling the stochastic aspects of a GDP. In any traffic flow management setting
the two key quantities of interest are demand and capacity. The  relevant capacity
for GDPs is the airport acceptance rate (AAR). Current GDP  procedures are
deterministic in nature and use a single AAR vector as their  input. The AAR of an
airport is determined largely by the runway  configuration and the type of flight
rules in effect, instrument flight  rules (IFR) or visual flight rules (VFR). Each of
these factors is dependent  upon weather conditions which are, of course, highly
stochastic. GDP  planning in the context of CDM with stochastic AAR inputs, has
been dealt  with in [Ball et al 1999a]. Further work is on-going to develop the
required  inputs (AAR distribution).    
Although the airlines are now reporting cancellations and delays in  real-time, not
all of these can be known hours in advance, when a GDP is  first formulated. Also,
there can be last-minute additions to the schedule  of incoming flights (called pop-
ups), largely stemming from general aviation  and military aircraft. In general,
GDP planning requires an accurate  estimate of the arrival demand profile. Recent
work has developed improved  methods for estimating departure times, which in
turn leads to improved  estimates of the timing of flight arrivals (see [Chaabouni
1999] and [Pujet  1999]). All work to-date on demand estimation builds upon
single  (deterministic) estimates of individual flight departure times. We see a
need to develop stochastic demand estimation models, which build upon
individual flight arrival time distributions.  
Current GDP planning is done in a single airport, arrival-oriented setting.  In
practice however, there is a trade off between an airport’s arrival and  departure
capacities. A rich area of research is to explore various  strategies for
incorporating departures into the planning of a GDP. In [Hall  1999], the CDM
paradigm is extended to include departures. In essence, each  airline is allowed to
balance its share of the departure resources at a GDP  airport along with its share
of arrival resources, thus distributing among  the airlines the decisions required for
balancing arrivals with departures.  We view the practical application of this
approach a promising next step for  CDM.    
3. Collaborative Routing    
CDM has been successfully implemented for GDP planning and control. The next
major challenge area for practical implementation is flow management in the en-
route airspace. The emerging area of Collaborative Routing (CR) refers to  the
application of CDM technologies and practices to near-real-time route  planning
and route adjustment.  In this section, we discuss  the fundamental research issues
related to Collaborative Routing and cite  the differences between the GDP and
en-route settings that make the transfer  of CDM technology from one to the other
challenging.  
3.1  User Needs
At this time in the US, the traffic flow management tools for controlling en-route
traffic consist of (1) time-based metering, which controls the time an aircraft is  to
pass over a geographical point, (2) distance-based metering, which  places a limit
on how closely one aircraft can follow another, (3) ground delays. The form of
 distance-based metering most commonly used is miles-in-trail (MIT), which
specifies a minimum separation (in miles) between aircraft moving in the  same
direction.  Currently, there are few decision support tools to aid airspace managers
in formulating these control actions and little collaboration between airspace users
and managers in the formulation of such actions.  We have formulated the
following three need categories to guide a future research agenda.
The need for a shared global picture of predicted capacity and demand for
various airspace resources:  In the recent past, airspace users have typically not
been informed of those MIT restrictions that are in place or those that are planned.
In cases where such restrictions lead to high delays along certain routes, airlines
(with prior knowledge) would file alternate routes to avoid such delays.  Thinking
longer term, a basic tenet of the CDM philosophy is to broadly share information
about anticipated resource utilization to allow users to independently react and
alter demand patterns.  Thus, a goal should be for a common view of anticipated
airspace demand and capacity restrictions to be shared among users and managers.
The need for real-time models that  predict the impact of potential control
actions and user decisions:   Today airspace managers must make decisions
regarding MIT restrictions and the rerouting of aircraft with little or no analytical
support.  Airspace users also lack models to predict the impact of their route
planning decisions on their own delays and overall airspace congestion.
Evaluation models for both groups are clearly called for.
The need for collaborative resource allocation mechanisms:   The process of
airline route planning and then the subsequent spatial or temporal modification of
planned routes by airspace managers today is done as a two step process with little
or no analytic support.  This is clearly a place where new collaborative resource
allocation mechanisms are called for.  The successful GDP procedures should
provide a starting point for this development.
3.2 Research Topics
The needs described in the previous section have led us to define the following
research areas.
Aggregate Flow Models and the Prediction of Capacity-Demand Imbalances.
In order to meet the fundamental information need discussed above, it is necessary
to predict traffic flows on time scales any where from minutes to a few hours in
advance.  These predictions in turn would lead to the identification of congestion
caused by capacity-demand imbalances.  We feel that the only way to properly
address this need would be through the development of stochastic airspace flow
models.  Such models would track the flow of aircraft into and out of airports and
through the airspace.  Most likely it would be appropriate to deal with flows at an
aggregate level and to take into account delays resulting from congestion within
the airspace or at airports.   The models should operate in real-time and should
continuously monitor, and react to, airspace conditions.  Thus, the models should
be built around the available real-time data sources and their characteristics.  Of
particular interest would be issues related to the merging  of airline data sources
with air traffic control data sources.   The accurate prediction of  capacity-demand
imbalance requires good estimation of capacity constraints.  Thus, models in this
area should build upon research which estimates the capacity of airspace
componnets, e.g. sector capacity models.
Estimation of Impact of Control Actions.  Models for predicting traffic flows
and airspace congestion, would provide airspace managers and users with alerts to
the need to take corrective actions.  The obvious second level of tool support
would be to provide decision makers with feedback on the implication of any
proposed action.  For example, airspace managers would like to know the impact
of proposed MIT restrictions or traffic reroute strategies.  Airline operational
control personnel would like to know the congestion-induced delays associated
with various alternate flight paths and even the system impact of major changes in
route structure.  Models of this type would be natural add-ons to the aggregate
flow models described above.
Collaborative Resource Allocation for the En-route Airspace. The most
sophisticated level of decision support would involve the development of
collaborative resource allocation mechanisms. A direct application of the CDM
processes used for GDPs to Collaborative Routing (CR) might be:
A:  An iterative process takes place between the airlines and traffic flow
management (TFM).  An iteration would consist of the airlines assigning routes to
flights followed by TFM scheduling flights, i.e. assigning takeoff times and en-
route delays, if appropriate.  TFM would also have the ability to assign alternate
routes under certain conditions.
Preliminary research [Goodhart and Yano (1999)] and practical use of CR suggest
the following process:
B:  The airlines provide inputs on their preferred routes and route alternatives,
together with criteria for choosing among the routing alternatives.   TFM then
assigns routes to flights taking into account the criteria provided by the airlines.
For either approach the following research issues would have to be addressed:
Characterization of airline preferences and trade-off criteria.   airlines must
specify criteria for choosing among the alternatives specified.  For a single flight
there might be a tradeoff between waiting on the ground in order to take a shorter
route with less fuel burn and taking off immediately but using a longer, more
expensive route.  Additionally, criteria would be required in order to determine
how to allocate delay among several flights.
Definition of fair allocation principles.  M will typically be faced with decisions
regarding the allocation of  delays among flights of competing airlines.  Criteria
are required to do this in a fair fashion (e.g. analogies to ration-by-schedule and
compression).
For approach B, it is necessary to represent a variety of routing alternatives and to
choose amongst them, leading to the following additional topics.
Characterization of routing alternatives acceptable to an airline.  In the simplest
case, an airline might specify a route and a small number of alternate routes.
However, given the combinatorial growth of route alternatives through the
airspace, a robust, flexible system should allow more flexible ways of specifying
alternatives, which could capture many possible alternatives in a compact way.
Development of route generation algorithms.  Given the issues discussed above,
one is left with a complex route choice problem.  When compared with existing
literature on such problems, e.g. [Bertsimas and Stock (1998), Bertsimas and
Stock- Patterson (1998)], one is faced with airline-specific route alternatives and
new classes of objective functions that involve fairness criteria (see [Goodhart and
Yano (1999)] for CDM related work).
The development of resource allocation mechanisms for the en-route airspace
would not doubt build upon and employ many of the ideas presented in Section  5.
4  Performance Monitoring and Analysis
As efforts increase to make more efficient use of airspace resources and to move
toward a more decentralized decision making paradigm, there is an increasing
need for quantitative assessments of conditions within the airspace and for the
evaluation of new programs and initiatives. CDM has dramatically highlighted
these needs. The two main stumbling blocks in the development of the necessary
tools are (1) the measurement of cost effectiveness in monetary terms or in terms
of airspace resources such as capacity or throughput and (2) the inherent difficulty
in evaluating the  contrasting hypothetical case, (i.e., what would have happened
had an  initiative not been made or done using prior technology). The areas of
concern can be roughly divided into three categories:
(i) Single-event predictions: The issue here is how to evaluate, both on an
aggregate and individual basis, the quality of information being submitted  for an
event that will occur at some future point in time. For instance,  given a stream of
ETAs (estimated time of arrival) for a single flight made  over, say, a 12-hour
period, how does one evaluate the quality of the  stream? In this case, a metric
such as IPE (integrated predictive error) can  be used to assign one performance
number to the entire stream of predictions  (see [Hoffman 1999] for details). This
integration-based metric is robust  with respect to isolated instances of bad
predictions and aggregates easily  over multiple flights. Other events of concern
are the departure time of a  flight, the number of aircraft that will arrive at an
airport during a given  hour, and the number of aircraft that will pass through a
fixed region of  the airspace.  
(ii) Value of CDM Data and Decision Processes: CDM procedures create new
 information streams by combining airspace manager (FAA, EuroControl, etc) and
user (airlines, GA, etc.) data sources. This information is then  distributed to both
airspace users and managers. For instance, under the CDM  flow of information,
the FAA now receives early cancellation notices on  individual flights. Prior to
CDM, cancellation notices were delivered on a  sporadic basis and on-the-average
after a flight’s scheduled departure time  (see [Ball et al 1999b]). Research topics
of interest are the assessment of  the added value of this new information stream
when compared to its  predecessor, and the impact of creating common situational
awareness by  distributing this information to all parties. Due to the use of
procedures  such as compression, overall GDP delay has been reduced by CDM
(see [Ball et  al 1999b]). A possibly more significant impact of CDM processes is
that  airlines are able to exercise more control over the allocation of delays to
 their own flights and to do so in a more timely fashion. Placing a value on  this
capability is a challenging problem.
(iii) Program performance: Although a GDP is planned by traffic flow  managers,
its success is contingent upon a wide variety of actions such as:  departure
compliance, inter-airline and intra-airline arrival slot  allocation, the submission of
timely data, weather forecasting, local  traffic control, en-route time estimations,
and the incorporation of  unscheduled flights (e.g., general aviation, and military
flights). Given  all these components, how does one rate the success of the overall
GDP? Can  a single metric be developed for this and how should it vary over time
as  GDP procedures become more refined?  
Some inroads to this has been made with the development of the rate control index
(RCI), which compares, post facto, the flow of traffic into the  terminal space of
an airport (or on the runways) against the flow rate that  was planned in the GDP
(see [Hoffman and Ball 1999]). The RCI factors out the  quality of the forecast
upon which the GDP was based and the ultimate  conditions at the airport during
the GDP. This allows it to rate execution  of a GDP independent of the
appropriateness of the underlying plan. It is  not designed, however, to measure
the effects of airborne holding during a  GDP or the ability of traffic flow
managers to dynamically revise GDP  parameters.  
5  Collaborative Resource Allocation Mechanisms
The broad application of CDM to resource allocation decisions is a rich and
challenging, research domain. At one extreme, the Air Traffic  Control/Traffic
Flow Management can be viewed as a centralized authority  that controls the
actions of all aircraft. This point of view, traditionally  taken in work on air traffic
flow management, naturally lends itself toward  the application of optimization
models (see, e.g., [Andreatta 1987] and  [Bertsimas and Stock 1998]). On the
other hand, the classical approach to  the analysis of ground transportation
problems views each vehicle as an  autonomous agent. This view lends itself
toward the application of network  equilibrium models to determine demand
distributions. (see, e.g., [Florian  and Hearn 1995]). In the aviation setting, the
individual commercial  aircraft are owned and operated by the airlines. CDM has
initiated a shift  away from the central authority paradigm by acknowledging that
the airlines  should play a substantial role in air traffic management. Thus, CDM
resource  allocation falls somewhere between the central controller and
autonomous  agent perspectives. This suggests a hybrid approach toward research
in  resource allocation involving techniques from optimization, game theory,
distributed control and related disciplines. The applicability of this  research will
most likely extend beyond the context of air transportation.  
In the context of ground delay programs [Hoffman et al 1999, Wambsganss 1997],
the CDM paradigm has led to several new operational procedures and algorithms,
in particular, the introduction of airport arrival slot  rationing through the ration-
by-schedule (RBS) algorithm and the  introduction of inter-airline arrival slot
swapping through the Compression  algorithm. The main principle underlying
these procedures has been the  consensus notion that each airline implicitly owns
the arrival capacity  allocated to it weeks in advance in the Official Airline Guide
(OAG)  schedule.
At the start of a GDP, the RBS algorithm honors this ownership by initially
rationing available arrival capacity in accordance with the OAG schedule.  Later
in the GDP, the airlines have the opportunity to reallocate slots  among their
flights to meet their respective economic objectives. When  flights are canceled or
delayed, slot vacancies can be created that are not  usable by the vacating airline,
thus leading to globally sub-optimal use of  airport resources. The Compression
algorithm rectifies this by reassigning  these slots to competing airlines, while at
the same time, rewarding the  vacating airline with other slot assignments that it
can make effective use  of. This acts as an incentive for airlines to submit
cancellation and  delayed flight information.
RBS and Compression successfully comprise a resource allocation mechanism
that shifts decision responsibilities to the AOCs, while ensuring globally  optimal
resource utilization (i.e. minimization of overall delays). Yet,  their specific
designs make it hard to incorporate incentive mechanisms and  fairness
considerations in more complex resource allocation decisions that  occur in the en-
route airspace or even in more advanced models for the  allocation of resources in
GDPs (e.g., [Hoffman 1998]). Therefore, a current  area of research considers how
to incorporate the incentive and fairness  considerations employed by RBS and
Compression into a model-based approach  which is more closely related to the
optimization models developed for the  pre-CDM environment.
We have developed a goal-programming based model [Vossen and Ball 1999] that
closely matches the reallocation of arrival slots that occurs in  Compression. Slot
ownership is defined by creating a set of goals or targets  for each airline that
represent the airline’s ideal’ utilization of its  slots, which may not be attainable
due to flight cancellations or delays.  The model aims to minimize the maximum
deviation from the defined sets of  goals in such a way that no airline can increase
its benefits without  reducing the benefits of other airlines. An earlier model that
uses goal  satisfaction is a multi-commodity extension of the (single-commodity)
basic  GDP optimization model [Butler 1998]. This movement away from an
approach  defined only by a procedure (Compression) to an optimization-based
allocation model allows for easier analysis of hypothetical changes to the
allocation procedure and yields a greater potential for the migration of the
reallocation process to more complex settings.
A suggested area of research is the redesign of the reallocation process  itself. For
instance, the reallocation of landing slots in Compression can  be viewed as a
situation in which airlines trade resources so as to achieve  mutual benefits. From
this perspective, Compression finds a subset of all  possible trades, using delay
minutes as a measure of airline benefits.  Hence, it would be worthwhile to
investigate whether it is possible to (a)  extend the trading options in the
reallocation process and/or (b) extend the  measure of benefits for airlines within
this framework. While such  extensions would not affect overall resource
utilization, they would likely  be of great significance to the airlines, given the
potential to increase  flexibility and enhance economic trade-offs. This work will
likely require  concepts from game theory, such as fairness, stability in trades and
coalition formation.
Another possibility is to relax the notion of resource ownership by allowing  the
airlines to competitively bid for resources. The relation between  applicability of
auctioning vs. trading mechanisms in a collaborative  resource allocation
environment is an interesting question in its own right,  which could lead to
important insights on the broad application of CDM. We  emphasize that any
comparison of resource allocation mechanisms should take  into account the ease
of implementation and the actual decision making  capabilities of the entities
involved.
6 Game Theory Models for Analyzing CDM
Procedures and Information Exchange
Due to the limited number of decision makers and the diversity of objectives  (or
interests), each airline’s decision has potential effects on the  performances of
other airlines’ objectives and tends to provoke  modifications of their decisions.
Therefore, the decision making processes  of the airlines are mutually dependent.
Economists suggest that Game Theory  can be used to analyze the interdependent
decision makings within air  transportation (see [Evans and Kessides 1994] and
[Gibbons 1992] for  background on the ideas discussed below).
CDM members provide and share accurate delay/cancellation information and
 create consensus weather information in order to make better and more
 synchronized decisions. In addition, through Compression, airlines exchange
 their unusable slots at arrival airports to avoid wasting valuable resources  and to
improve mutual benefits. Thus, it is through mutual cooperation (and  trust) that
CDM is able to improve the system-wide performance.
Under the CDM paradigm, there are three basic forces that keep an airline  from
deviating from cooperative behavior. Firstly, there is the goodwill  towards the
CDM. This has been a powerful force to support the cooperation.  However, from
an economics point of view, this force may be too weak to be  sustained in the
long run, given the competitiveness within the industry  paradigm. Secondly, there
is the peer pressure as described by the  “Contestablity Theory” in the economics
literature [Bailey and Panzar  1981]. This theory says that in multiple-market
environment, an oligopoly  company will neither raise its price too high to attract
market entries nor  cut its price too low to provoke price wars in other markets.
This theory  suggests that an airline may adhere to cooperative behavior simply to
avoid  provoking non-cooperative reprisals from competitors. Thirdly, the FAA
 performs (limited) supervision and enforcement functions on top of the  system.
However, these forces may not be strong enough to support the
cooperative paradigm in the long run, especially once the airlines become
intimately  familiar with their roles in the new procedures invoked by CDM. In
game  theory parlance, the current CDM paradigm is not supported by a stable
cooperative structure, much like the prisoners in the famous Game Theory  model
- the Prisoner's Dilemma. For instance, an airline could potentially  gain more
delay reduction if it unilaterally delays the announcement of its  delays and
cancellations than if it cooperatively provides timely  information. Since most
airline information is proprietary, it is hard to  detect whether an airline is gaming
the situation through manipulation of  the information that it supplies.
In the short run, cooperative behavior in the CDM paradigm can be enhanced  by
employing more non-cooperative behavior monitoring and correction  devices. For
example, a mechanism can be imbedded into the Flight Schedule  Monitor tool to
force flight substitutions on the behalf of bridge-only  airlines who do not make
use of arrival slots (the bridge-only status  exempts an airline from certain flight
movements that would naturally occur  in the Compression Algorithm). Failure to
submit flight arrival delay  notices can be detected by checking for delays in flight
departures that  would inevitably lead to arrival delays. Also, a shortening of the
compression cycle may reduce the damaging effects of erroneous or omitted flight
information, thus removing some of the incentive to withhold  information.
In the long run, the cooperative paradigm is best supported by the provision  of
economic incentives for the airlines to release timely information rather  than the
administration of punitive actions. This requires that an  individual airline’s
interest be aligned with the interests of the overall  system. Fairness issues should
be addressed when designing the new incentive  structure. In addition, the
definition of the measurements for the  objectives to be optimized is another
important issue. The difficulty lies  in the measurements of efficiency, safety, and
costs. The trading or  auctioning-based procedures mentioned in the prior section
may contain  appropriate incentive structures.
7 Collaborative Information Collection and
Distribution
One of the maxims of collaborative decision making is that more information  is
better. However, individuals can become swamped with too much or inappropriate
information. Airspace managers are particularly susceptible to  this because many
of them are making real-time decisions under pressure with potentially devastating
consequences both in terms of resources and safety.  CDM has been enormously
successful at generating common situational  awareness through information
dissemination. However, more research in air  traffic management is required with
regard to the following human-factors  issues.
  Which parties need which information and in what form?
  Should all parties have the same information?
  At what point does operational information become proprietary?
  At what point does information availability become counterproductive?
  How do we measure the value of information dissemination and how do we
weigh it against the costs of start-up and ongoing maintenance?
The predecessor of CDM, the FADE program, successfully addressed these  issues
for one facet of air traffic management. In particular, it showed  that the
dissemination of a common aggregate picture to both traffic flow  managers and
airline dispatchers could have a positive impact on the  decision making processes
involved in the planning and maintenance of a GDP  (see [Wambsganss 1997]).
Research into these issues must be combined with  long-range planning to produce
directives for future information gathering  and distribution.
In addition to distributing decision making a key aspect of CDM, which many
would argue is the most important, is information sharing. In the present
implementation of CDM, flight status information generated by the airlines  is
merged with FAA generated information to produce a higher quality picture  of
the system-wide status. Furthermore, both the FAA and the airlines using  the
Flight Schedule Monitor (FSM) decision support tool share a common view  of
this higher quality information. It is only because both the FAA and the  airlines
had a strong desire for the merged information stream and because  both brought
substantial value to the table that the effort was successful.  Now the broader
aviation community, including airports, general aviation,  related ground-side
transportation concerns, etc., has expressed a desire to  gain access to this
information resource. There is resistance to providing  such access due to
information privacy concerns and also, the simple  acknowledgment that this
information has value and should not simply be  given away. This environment is
an example of the growing importance and  value of information within our
society and of the associated economic  complexities. The extension of CDM to a
broader group of players requires  research into economic models of information
providers and consumers with  the objective of providing a solution that can be
applied within the air  transportation setting.
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